Aid View
| General Information |
Project/Program |
Project |
| Project Name |
Rural Electrification and Transmission Project |
| Duration |
P064844; Board of Approval: 12/16/2003 Closing Date: (original) 6/30/2009 (actual): 1/31/2012
P071591; Board of Approval: 12/16/2003 Closing Date (original): 6/30/2009 (actual): 1/31/2012 |
| Donor |
World Bank |
| Implementiong Organization |
Electricite du Cambodge (ECD), Electricity Authority of Cambodia (EAC), Ministry of industry, Mines, and Energy (MIME), Rural Electrification Fund (REF) |
| Sector and/or Subsector Classification |
Infrastructure |
| Region |
Refer to the World Bank's Implementation Completion Report. |
| Financing |
Project estimate during appraisal was USD 150.12 million; actual project costs are USD 126.59 million. Borrower for IDA components assisted USD 4.74 million, borrower for ADB components assisted USD 8.6 million, International Development Association assisted USD 40 million, Private Commercial Sources (unidentified) assisted USD 25.85 million and the ADB jointly assisted the project with USD 51.81 million. |
| Analytical Information |
Stakeholders |
Asian Development Bank, Electricity Authority of Cambodia, National Control Center, Non-Governmental Organization, Executive Director, Electricite du Cambodge, Project Management Unit, Public Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility, Rural Energy Enterprise, Global Environment Facility, Rural Electrification Fund Secretariat, Royal Bank of Cambodia, World Bank, International Development Association, International Procurement Agent, Independent Power Producers, Inter-ministerial Resettlement Committee, Social and Environment Unit (of EDC), Ministry of Economy and Finance, Ministry of Industry, Mines, and Energy, affected people (112,000 consumers in urban and rural areas which include the 100,000 households that would be served by the EDC, and REE and the 12,000 that would be provided by the Solar Home Systems (SHS)), civil society, broader electricity sector. |
| Cross-cutting Issue |
Environment |
Elections in 2003 had created delays in formation of the Government; the legal documents were delayed by a year (to November 2004) leading the World Bank to reorder the financing date aligned with the Credit Effectiveness. In addition, during project preparations, the project faced delays in appointing the right management staff; the final appointments were completed after a one year delay. Furthermore, SHS installations could not be afforded by rural households; households were allowed to pay installments over a 48 time period leading to increasing interest rates. |
| Gender |
No information regarding gender was to be found in the World Bank Implementation Completion Report. |
| Impact Analysis |
The project aligns with the Renewable Energy Action Plan (May 2003), Energy Sector Strategy for Cambodia, the Renewable Energy Strategy (2001), and the World Bank's Country Assistance Strategy (Feb 2000). |
| Effectiveness |
Ownership/Partnership |
Evaluation |
From project preparation, the Government's commitment was very highly noted by the World Bank; they showed commitment in making policy decisions, rural electrification agendas, and asking adequate help and assistance from the necessary departments for financial support. |
| Rating |
4/5 |
| Policy Coherence/Harmonization |
Evaluation |
Under the Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP 4.12), Resettlement Action Plans, Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF), Ethnic Minority Development Strategy (EMDS), all stakeholders brought together community groups, national government, Non-Governmental Organizations, and development partners to discuss and safely relocate the relocated people. This project introduced a Good Governance theme; this was a remedial measure due to identification of fiduciary issues in 2006. A workshop was conducted for stakeholders to share opportunities, lessons, challenges, outcomes, and express their views. |
| Rating |
4/5 |
| Evaluation Framework |
Evaluation |
The World Bank conducted 13 implementation support missions and actual field visits. Monitoring was also conducted by an independent organization. Lessons of the project, according to the Implementation Completion Report, a better monitor and evaluation framework is essential for assessing the achievements. |
| Rating |
3/5 |
| Alignment/Composition of Finance |
Evaluation |
Procurement complaints were raised by some bidders (although the exact problems were not mentioned); according to the World Bank Implementation Completion Report, the problem was solved with adequate clarifications. This led to a procurement delay. |
| Rating |
2/5 |
| Other Remarks |
Among the seven World Bank projects that were suspended due to corruption and fraud, this project was not one of the seven. |
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