| General Information |
Project/Program |
Project |
| Project Name |
Emergency Rehabilitation Project |
| Duration |
Board of Approval Date: October 26, 1993 Closing Date (original): June 30, 1996, (actual): December 31, 1996 |
| Donor |
World Bank |
| Implementiong Organization |
Royal Government of Cambodia |
| Sector and/or Subsector Classification |
Emergency |
| Region |
Not applicable |
| Financing |
International Development Agency financed USD 62.7 million, SIDA financed USD 2.3million, and the Government financed USD 8.1 million, a total of USD 73.1 million. |
| Analytical Information |
Stakeholders |
Asian Development Bank, World Bank, Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, International Committee for the Reconstruction of Cambodia, International Development Association, International Development Fund, International Monetary Fund, International Grant Facility, National Bank of Cambodia, Non-Governmental Organizations, Project Implementation Unit, Swedish International Development Agency, Supreme National Council of Cambodia, United Nations Development Program, United Nations High Commission for Refugees, United Nations Transnational Authority in Cambodia, Civil Society, Contractors |
| Cross-cutting Issue |
Environment |
Project negotiations were affected by Cambodia's political parties regarding design and scope. The parties believed the need to secure the benefits of the project to each of their parties, although none of them were familiar with donor financed projects. In the end, the project had to drop all contracts that were time-consuming and unable within the given timeframe. Due to the nature of the project, agricultural and transportation plans had to be cancelled, whereas General Critical Imports benefited the most. |
| Gender |
No information regarding Gender was to be found in the Implementation Completion Report. |
| Impact Analysis |
As the government was established through UN support in 1993, the Government lacked any national development strategies, political agendas, etc. World Bank on the other hand, was able to draft assistance strategy and developing mechanisms through this first project. Overall, the project aligns with World Bank's emergency operations. |
| Effectiveness |
Ownership/Partnership |
Evaluation |
According to the Implementation Completion Report, the Government had little leverage over the preparation of the project, but was fully engaged once the project setting was available. The Ministries held Council meetings to educate and familiarize the procedures and gave effective and immediate feedback to World Bank. |
| Rating |
3/5 |
| Policy Coherence/Harmonization |
Evaluation |
Technical assistances were attached financed by the UNDP and executed by World Bank. No further information regarding policy coherence and harmonization among donors are to be found in the Implementation Completion Report. |
| Rating |
N.A. |
| Evaluation Framework |
Evaluation |
According to the Implementation Completion Report, World Bank had easy access of supervision to the key Cambodian authorities, beneficiary agencies, and Ministry. On the other hand, the Cambodian Government's evaluation and supervisory capacity was almost non-existent. |
| Rating |
3/5 |
| Alignment/Composition of Finance |
Evaluation |
As an emergency rehabilitation project, sustainability was a serious concern; thus, several follow up operations were considered/implemented: Phnom Penh Power Rehabilitation Project, Agriculture Productivity Improvement Project, Water Supply Rehabilitation Project, Road Rehabilitation Project, Economic Rehabilitation Credit etc. |
| Rating |
3/5 |
| Other Remarks |
After the UN supported elections, the international society believed Cambodia needed a quick infusion of capital and World Bank was in the best position to intervene. This is the first credit to Cambodia by the International Development Assistance. As opposed to an investment operation, the project was an emergency rehabilitation, aiming for short term development through list of imported goods. |
